



NATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF  
**TELEHEALTH**  
RESOURCE CENTERS


**CISA Services: Federal  
Cybersecurity Resources for  
Telehealth**

November 14, 2024



# HRSA Funded Telehealth Resource Centers

[www.telehealthresourcecenter.org](http://www.telehealthresourcecenter.org)



|                              |        |       |
|------------------------------|--------|-------|
| NRTRC                        | gpTRAC | NETRC |
| CTRC                         | HTRC   | UMTRC |
| SWTRC                        | SCTRC  | MATRC |
| PBTRC                        | TexLa  | SETRC |
| 12 REGIONAL RESOURCE CENTERS |        |       |

|  |  |
|--|--|
|  TTAC<br>TelehealthTechnology.org |  CCHP |
| 2 NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTERS  |  |

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- Please submit your questions using the Q&A function.
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- Recordings will be posted to our YouTube Channel:  
<https://www.youtube.com/c/nctrc>



# CISA/HHS CYBERSECURITY TOOLKIT

Travis Light  
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HHS ASPR Senior Cyber Security Advisor



# CISA

**CYBERSECURITY &  
INFRASTRUCTURE  
SECURITY AGENCY**

# Today's Roadmap

- **Intro to CISA & HHS ASPR**
- Threat Environment
- Joint Cybersecurity Toolkit
- HHS Cyber Performance Goals
- Additional Resources



# Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

## VISION

Secure and resilient infrastructure for the American people.

## MISSION

Lead the national effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to the nation's cyber and physical infrastructure.





# CISA's Core Capabilities

## AT A GLANCE



PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT



INFORMATION AND DATA SHARING



CAPACITY BUILDING



INCIDENT MANAGEMENT & RESPONSE



RISK ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS




NETWORK DEFENSE



EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

















# CISA Regions

- 1 Boston, MA
- 2 New York, NY
- 3 Philadelphia, PA
- 4 Atlanta, GA
- 5 Chicago, IL
- 6 Dallas, TX
- 7 Kansas City, MO
- 8 Denver, CO
- 9 Oakland, CA
- 10 Seattle, WA





# 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors & Corresponding Sector Risk Management Agencies

|  |      |  |            |
|--|------|--|------------|
|  CHEMICAL                 | CISA |  FINANCIAL                              | Treasury   |
|  COMMERCIAL FACILITIES    | CISA |  FOOD & AGRICULTURE                     | USDA & HHS |
|  COMMUNICATIONS           | CISA |  GOVERNMENT FACILITIES                  | DHS & GSA  |
|  CRITICAL MANUFACTURING   | CISA |  HEALTHCARE & PUBLIC HEALTH             | HHS        |
|  DAMS                     | CISA |  INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY                 | CISA       |
|  DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE | DOD  |  NUCLEAR REACTORS, MATERIALS AND WASTE | CISA       |
|  EMERGENCY SERVICES     | CISA |  TRANSPORTATIONS SYSTEMS              | TSA & USCO |
|  ENERGY                 | DOE  |  WATER                                | EPA        |





## Healthcare and Public Health Sector

The Healthcare and Public Health Sector focuses on population health and provides the response and recovery actions needed after large-scale hazards such as terrorism, infection disease, and natural disasters.



# ASPR serves as the HHS “One-Stop-Shop” for Healthcare and Public Health cybersecurity



# Health Sector Coordinating Council



## Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council Cybersecurity Working Group

- Industry Council of 400+ healthcare providers, pharmaceutical and medtech companies, payers and health IT entities
- Partnered with Federal Government
- HHS 405(d) Program Task Group









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# Threat Actors and Motivation

| THREATS    | HACKTIVISM   | CRIME  | INSIDER  | ESPIONAGE  | TERRORISM   | WARFARE  |
|------------|--|--|--|--|---|--|
|            |       |                                     |                |   |                                  |                                       |
| MOTIVATION | Hackers use computer network exploitation to advance their political or social causes. | Individuals and sophisticated criminal enterprises steal personal information and extort victims for financial gain. | Trusted insiders steal proprietary information for personal, financial, and ideological reasons. | Nation-state actors conduct computer intrusions to steal sensitive state secrets and propriety information from private companies. | Terrorist groups sabotage the computer systems that operate our critical infrastructure, such as the electric grid. | Nation-state actors sabotage military and critical infrastructure systems to gain an advantage in the event of conflict. |





# Threat Categories

## Cyber Threats



Social engineering



Ransomware attacks



Loss or theft of  
equipment or data



Insider, accidental or  
malicious data loss



Attacks against  
network connected  
medical devices that  
may affect patient  
safety





# Threat Actors Can Use AI Too

- **Social Engineering:** GPT-crafted phishing emails; deepfaked calls and videos
- **AI-powered Malware:** Lower barriers to entry; autonomous zero-day attacks
- **Supply Chain Attacks:** Compromise the AI services you rely on or use AI to attack those services
- **AI Poisoning:** Deliberate and malicious contamination of the data that trains your AI systems, leading to incorrect or even harmful responses



# The Threat is Real – Prospect Holdings

## Prospect Medical Holdings

- 16 Hospitals / 160+ Clinics
- Emergency rooms closed
- Ambulances diverted
- Reverted to manual processes for medical records, labs, & radiology
- 500,000 patient records claimed stolen
- **On sale for 50 Bitcoin! (\$1.3M)**





Office of  
**Information Security**  
Securing One HHS



Health Sector Cybersecurity  
Coordination Center

### HC3: Sector Alert

August 4, 2023    TLP:CLEAR    Report: 202308041500

## HC3 TLP Clear - Sector Alert: Rhysida Ransomware - August 4, 2023

### Executive Summary

Rhysida is a new ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group that has emerged since May 2023. The group drops an eponymous ransomware via phishing attacks and Cobalt Strike to breach targets' networks and deploy their payloads. The group threatens to publicly distribute the exfiltrated data if the ransom is not paid. Rhysida is still in early stages of development, as indicated by the lack of advanced features and the program name Rhysida-0.1. The ransomware also leaves PDF notes on the affected folders, instructing the victims to contact the group via their portal and pay in Bitcoin. Its victims are distributed throughout several countries across Western Europe, North and South America, and Australia. They primarily attack education, government, manufacturing, and technology and managed service provider sectors; however, there has been recent attacks against the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector.

# The Threat is Real – Change Health

## Change Healthcare

- UnitedHealth Group
- Processes ~14B claims each year
- Relief programs established by UnitedHealth and HHS
- Potential ransom of \$22M
- “Significant portion” of US citizens’ data compromised



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November 14, 2024

# The Threat is Real – Supply Chain

## Change Healthcare - Round 2

- 4TB of data exfiltrated
- **Different threat actor**
  - 1<sup>st</sup> was ALPHV/Blackcat
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> was RansomHub



### Round 2: Change Healthcare Targeted in Second Ransomware Attack

RansomHub, which is speculated to have some connection to ALPHV, has stolen 4TB of sensitive data from the beleaguered healthcare company.



Dark Reading Staff, Dark Reading

April 8, 2024

🕒 2 Min Read



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# CISA/HHS Cybersecurity Roundtable

***“Given that healthcare organizations have a combination of personally identifiable information, financial information, health records, and countless medical devices, they are essentially a one-stop shop for an adversary.”***

*- CISA Deputy Director Nitin Natarajan*



# CISA/HHS Cybersecurity Roundtable

*“We have seen a significant rise in the number and severity of cyber attacks against hospitals and health systems in the last few years. **These attacks expose vulnerabilities in our healthcare system, degrade patient trust, and ultimately endanger patient safety.***

*- HHS Deputy Secretary Andrea Palm*





# The Threat is Real – Prospect Holdings

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# CISA/HHS Cybersecurity Toolkit

Consolidates CISA and HHS resources such as:

- [Cyber Performance Goals for Healthcare](#)
- [CISA's Free Cybersecurity Services & Tools](#)
- Alerts & Advisories
- Training & Exercises
- Incident Response Guides



[Link to CISA/HHS Toolkit](#)

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# CISA/HHS: Resiliency Landscape Analysis



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[Link to CISA/HHS Toolkit](#)



# CISA/HHS: Resiliency Landscape Analysis

## Key Findings

- 1) Growing threat of ransomware
- 2) Variable adoption of critical security features
  - 1) MFA
  - 2) Vulnerability Assessments
  - 3) Training & Outreach
  - 4) Hospital-at-Home
- 3) Email protections are way up!
- 4) Supply chain risk is pervasive
- 5) Medical devices generally aren't targeted

| No Action Required—<br>Significant Progress<br>Made                       | Urgent Improvement Needed  | Additional Research<br>Required  | Further Attention<br>Required (Not Urgent)  |
|---|--|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>E-mail protection systems</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Endpoint Protection Systems</li><li>Identity and Access Management</li><li>Network Management</li><li>Vulnerability Management</li><li>Security Operation Center and Incident Response</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>IT Asset Management</li><li>Network Connected Medical Device Security</li><li>Cybersecurity Oversight and Governance</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Data Protection and Loss Prevention</li></ul> |



[Link to CISA/HHS Toolkit](#)

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# CISA/HHS: Resiliency Landscape Analysis

## Key Findings

- 6) Inconsistency across health orgs
- 7) Use of antiquated hardware, software, and systems
- 8) Insurance premiums continue to rise
- 9) Recruiting and retaining cyber talent is a challenge
- ✓ 10) **Adopting Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices works!**

| No Action Required—<br>Significant Progress<br>Made                       | Urgent Improvement Needed  | Additional Research<br>Required  | Further Attention<br>Required (Not Urgent)  |
|---|--|--|---|
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[Link to CISA/HHS Toolkit](#)

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- **HHS Cyber Performance Goals**
- Additional Resources



# Cyber Performance Goals - Healthcare

## Cyber Performance Goals (CPGs) Assessment:

- Voluntary guidelines tailored to Healthcare organizations



**10 Essential Goals** establish a floor of safeguards that will better protect from cyber attacks, improve response when events occur, and minimize residual risk



**10 Enhanced Goals** provide a path to reach the next level of defense needed to protect against additional attack vectors



[Link to HHS CPGs](#)



# Why Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) now?

Based on industry-specific analysis, the CPGs set a floor for cybersecurity expectations for all healthcare and public health organizations, no matter their size or cyber maturity. The CPGs map directly to existing cybersecurity frameworks, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, the Healthcare Industry Cybersecurity Practices (HICP), and the National Cybersecurity Strategy.



## Increasing attacks

Between 2018-2022, the HPH Sector saw a **93% increase in large, reported breaches** and a **278% increase in large breaches involving ransomware**.



## Chronic underfunding

Cybersecurity planning efforts are chronically underfunded, leaving the Sector vulnerable and unable to address, or mitigate, cybersecurity risks.




## Evolving threat landscape

The type, size, frequency, and scale of impact of cybersecurity attacks is continuously evolving and, due to a myriad factors, the HPH Sector cannot keep up.



## Requests for clear guidance

The HPH Sector has asked for help prioritizing most impactful practices to enhance cybersecurity tailored to their needs.



# of cyberattacks on the HPH Sector, by type: Q3, 2023

# What are the Healthcare and Public Health Sector-specific Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs)?

The HPH CPGs were developed and adapted from the 2023 DHS/CISA-led Cross-Sector CPGs and provide HPH Sector-specific cybersecurity guidance to healthcare and public health organizations at all levels of technical competency and resource-availability.

## Overview

A **baseline set of recommended cybersecurity controls and best practices** with known risk-reduction values


**Developed by HHS, DHS/CISA, and the private sector community** for information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) owners and operators to improve the state of cybersecurity within HPH entities

HHS CPGs **work to simplify the confusion** of multiple frameworks and recommendations, and **support compliance** with other regulatory requirements

## Benefits



Strengthen cyber preparedness



Improve cyber resilience



Protect patient information and safety



# How can your organization take immediate action?

The HPH CPGs help provide layered protection at different points of potential exploitation in healthcare digital systems. Layered protection at key points along the cybersecurity attack chain are crucial to mitigating the impacts of cybersecurity attacks when they occur. The HPH CPGs are divided into two categories supporting this layered approach:



## Essential Goals



Essential Goals **set a floor of safeguards** to help healthcare organizations **address common vulnerabilities**, improve response when events occur, and minimize residual risk.



### Examples of Essential Goals

- Mitigate known vulnerabilities
- Enhance email security
- Implement multifactor authentication
- Promote strong encryption
- Use unique credentials
- Separate user and privileged accounts
- Establish both vendor and supplier cybersecurity requirements



## Enhanced Goals



Enhanced Goals **enable organizations to mature their cybersecurity capabilities** and enhance the defenses needed to protect against less common, but potentially more impactful, attack vectors.



### Examples of Enhanced Goals

- Develop and oversee an asset inventory
- Implement third party vulnerability disclosures
- Establish cybersecurity testing procedures and norms
- Segment networks, especially mission critical assets
- Centralize log collection
- Centralize incident planning and preparedness
- Manage device and systems settings in a consistent manner

## Essential Goals

To help healthcare organizations address common vulnerabilities by setting a floor of safeguards that will better protect them from cyber attacks, improve response when events occur, and minimize residual risk.

To aid in further understanding the alignment to HICP we have included the links to the HICP sub-practices page for each CPG.

[Expand All](#) [Collapse All](#)

### Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities

Reduce the likelihood of threat actors exploiting known vulnerabilities to breach organizational networks that are directly accessible from the Internet.

#### HICP Practices:

- Vulnerability Management
- Endpoint Protection

#### HICP Sub-Practices:

- Host/Server-Based Scanning ([7.M.A](#))
- Web Application Scanning ([7.M.B](#))
- Basic Endpoint Protection ([2.M.A](#))

#### NIST Controls

CA-2, CA-5, CA-7, CA-8, PM-4, PM-15, RA-3, RA-5, SA-5, SA-11, SI-2, SI-4, SI-5, RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, SI-2, CA-5, PM-4, PM-9, PM-28, RA-7, CA-1, CA-2, RA-1, PM-4, PM-15, RA-7, SI-5, SR-6 AC-1, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, SC-15

#### CISA CPG IDs

- Mitigating Known Vulnerabilities (1.E)
- No Exploitable Services on the Internet (2.W)

#### Additional Resources:

- [CISA's Vulnerability Scanning \(VS\)](#)
- [Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog](#)

## Essential Goals

The Essential Goals are as follows:

- **Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities:** Reduce the likelihood of threat actors exploiting known vulnerabilities to breach organizational networks that are directly accessible from the Internet.
- **Email Security:** Reduce risk from common email-based threats, such as email spoofing, phishing, and fraud.
- **Multifactor Authentication:** Add a critical, additional layer of security, where safe and technically capable, to protect assets and accounts directly accessible from the Internet.
- **Basic Cybersecurity Training:** Ensure organizational users learn and perform more secure behaviors.
- **Strong Encryption:** Deploy encryption to maintain confidentiality of sensitive data and integrity of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) traffic in motion.
- **Revoke Credentials for Departing Workforce Members, Including Employees, Contractors, Affiliates, and Volunteers:** Prevent unauthorized access to organizational accounts or resources by former workforce members, including employees, contractors, affiliates, and volunteers by removing access promptly.
- **Basic Incident Planning and Preparedness:** Ensure safe and effective organizational responses to, restoration of, and recovery from significant cybersecurity incidents.
- **Unique Credentials:** Use unique credentials inside organizations' networks to detect anomalous activity and prevent attackers from moving laterally across the organization, particularly between IT and OT networks.
- **Separate User and Privileged Accounts:** Establish secondary accounts to prevent threat actors from accessing privileged or administrative accounts when common user accounts are compromised.
- **Vendor/Supplier Cybersecurity Requirements:** Identify, assess, and mitigate risks associated with third party products and services.

# 405(d) Outreach & Program Resources

## HHS/405(d) Awareness Materials

## 405(d) Outreach



## Knowledge on Demand

## Official Task Group Products

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# CISA/HHS Toolkit: Address Resource Constraints

## Healthcare and Public Health Sector: Address Resource Constraints

Recognizing that the nation's healthcare systems and providers have been under severe resource constraints—especially since the start of COVID-19—members of the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector should actively take steps to address their constraints.

### Use free or low-cost services to make near-term improvements when resources are scarce

The tools and resources offered by CISA in this toolkit are available at no cost. In addition, HHS hosts [Knowledge on Demand \(KOD\)](#) a free cybersecurity education platform that includes multiple delivery methodologies to reach health care facilities of all sizes across the country.



[Link to CISA/HHS Toolkit](#)

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# CISA/HHS Toolkit: Knowledge On Demand

## Knowledge on Demand

Knowledge on Demand (KOD) is a cybersecurity education platform that includes multiple delivery methodologies to reach the varied size health care facilities across the country. Five cybersecurity trainings that align with the top five cybersecurity threats outlined in HICP are featured for training your healthcare staff, security team, and any other department that is on the front lines for protecting patient safety. The best part about this resource? It's FREE!

Test your knowledge of all 5 KOD Threat Videos.  
Click to begin →

Download LMS Version




Each training contains:

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Job Aid</b><br>These are single documents with key tips related to the topic. This format is meant to be used as an "on-the-job" resource tool. They can provide instructional steps if necessary to meet the training objectives.   | <b>Interactive Video</b><br>These videos are launched from the 405(d) KOD webpage. They include recorded audio to take the trainee through the video along with interactive content to include knowledge checks and animations.  |
| <b>PowerPoint with Presenter Notes</b><br>These can be leveraged for in person or on-site presentations. These will include facilitator notes with slide specific content and knowledge checks to reinforce learning. Such presentations can be delivered in presentation mode or in a "Lunch n Learn" format at your location. | <b>Learning Management System</b><br>Content intended for a Learning Management System (LMS) will be similar in look and experience as the previously discussed Interactive Training video. Content will be exported and saved to a file type compatible for import to an organization's LMS platform. |



Social Engineering



Ransomware



Loss or Theft of Equipment or Data



Insider, Accidental or Malicious Data Loss



Attacks Against Network Connected Medical Devices



[Link to CISA/HHS Toolkit](#)

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# CISA/HHS Toolkit: Knowledge On Demand

KNOWLEDGE ON DEMAND

## Social Engineering



Launch Training

NOTE: The training will launch in a new window.

Social Engineering is an attempt to trick you into giving out personal information or infecting your device by clicking on a link to give hackers access to patient data. This training includes statistics and resources to help spot social engineering and what to do when you encounter it.

[Job Aid](#) [PowerPoint with presenter notes](#) [LMS Version](#)


WE WANT YOUR FEEDBACK



[Link to CISA/HHS Toolkit](#)

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# Cybersecurity Assessments



# Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program

## Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program Guards Your Information

- Sensitive critical infrastructure information voluntarily given to CISA is protected by law from
  - Public release under Freedom of Information Act requests,
  - Public release under State, local, tribal, or territorial disclosure laws,
  - Use in civil litigation and
  - Use in regulatory purposes.
- To learn more, visit [www.dhs.gov/pcii](https://www.dhs.gov/pcii)




# Vulnerability Scanning

- Automated scanning of **External-facing, Internet accessible** systems (Top 1000 Ports, can include cloud sites)
- **Weekly report** card that includes current scan results, historic trends, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, and comparisons to the national average
- Helps you understand your unique exposure
- **Know what the Internet already knows about your environment!**



Sign up by emailing  
[vulnerability@cisa.dhs.gov](mailto:vulnerability@cisa.dhs.gov)  
with subject line  
“Requesting Cyber Hygiene Services”





# #StopRansomware

#STOPRANSOMWARE  
AVOSLOCKER  
RANSOMWARE

STOP  
RANSOM  
WARE



STOP  
RANSOM  
WARE

UPDATED

#STOPRANSOMWARE  
GUIDE

HAVE YOU  
BEEN HIT BY  
RANSOMWARE?

LEARN MORE



Ransomware is a form of malware designed to encrypt files on a device, rendering any files and the systems that rely on them unusable.

Malicious actors then demand ransom in exchange for decryption.

[StopRansomware.gov](https://stopransomware.gov) is the U.S. Government's official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively.

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# Cyber Tabletop Exercises (CTTX)

- National Cyber Exercise Program
- Premade CISA Tabletop Exercise Packages (CTEP) to help develop your own:
  - [Healthcare & Public Health Sector Cyber CTEP Situation Manual](#)
  - [Ransomware CTEP Situation Manual](#)
  - [Ransomware Third Party Vendor CTEP Situation Manual](#)
  - [Vendor Phishing CTEP Situation Manual](#)



[Link to CISA CTEPs](#)



# Protective Security Advisor (PSA)



- **INFRASTRUCTURE SURVEY TOOL** - Identifying facilities' physical security, security forces, security management, information sharing, protective measures, and dependencies related to preparedness, mitigation, response, resilience, and recovery;
- **Assist Visit** – Identifies and recommends protective measures at facilities, provide comparison across like assets, and track implementation of new protective measures.
- **Infrastructure Visualization Platform (IVP)** – brings a facility's digital floorplans to life by placing on it 360° panoramic photographs, immersive video, geospatial information, and hypermedia data of critical facilities, surrounding areas, and transportation routes that assist with security planning, protection, and response efforts.
- **SAFE Tool** The Security Assessment at First Entry (SAFE) tool is designed to assess the current security posture and identify options for facility owners and operators to mitigate relevant threats



CISA Protective Security Advisors

Travis Light  
November 14, 2024

# QUESTIONS?



For more information, visit **CISA.gov** or contact **central@cisa.dhs.gov**

# Our Next Webinar

## The NCTRC Webinar Series

Occurs 3<sup>rd</sup> Thursday of every month.

**Hosting TRC:** Mid-Atlantic Telehealth Resource Center (MATRC)

**Telehealth Topic:** Breaking Down Barriers to Telehealth: How the Digital Health Readiness Screener Can Drive Equity and Access

**Date:** January 16, 2025

**Times:** 11 AM – 12 PM (PT)



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